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We develop a simple model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that is consistent with
a number of stylized features of the data. In particular, the model predicts positive as well as zero trade
flows across pairs of countries, and it allows the number of exporting firms to vary across destination
countries. As a result, the impact of trade frictions on trade flows can be decomposed into the intensive
and extensive margins, where the former refers to the trade volume per exporter and the latter refers
to the number of exporters. This model yields a generalized gravity equation that accounts for the self-selection
of firms into export markets and their impact on trade volumes. We then develop a two-stage estimation
procedure that uses a selection equation into trade partners in the first stage and a trade flow equation
in the second. We implement this procedure parametrically, semi-parametrically, and non-parametrically,
showing that in all three cases the estimated effects of trade frictions are similar. Importantly, our method
provides estimates of the intensive and extensive margins of trade. We show that traditional estimates
are biased, and that most of the bias is not due to selection but rather due to the omission of the extensive
margin. Moreover, the effect of the number of exporting firms varies across country pairs according
to their characteristics. This variation is large, and particularly so for trade between developed and




















Estimation of international trade ￿ ows has a long tradition. Tinbergen (1962) pioneered the use of
gravity equations in empirical speci￿cations of bilateral trade ￿ ows, in which the volume of trade
between two countries is proportional to the product of an index of their economic size, and the
factor of proportionality depends on measures of ￿trade resistance￿ between them. Among the
measures of trade resistance, he included geographic distance, a dummy for common borders, and
dummies for Commonwealth and Benelux memberships. Tinbergen￿ s speci￿cation has been widely
used, simply because it provides a good ￿t to most data sets of regional and international trade
￿ ows. And over time, his approach has been furnished with theoretical underpinnings and better
estimation techniques.1
While the accurate estimation of international trade ￿ ows is important for an understanding of
the structure of world trade, the accuracy of such estimates and their interpretation have gained
added signi￿cance as a result of their wide use in various branches of the empirical literature.
These studies rely on measures of trade openness as instruments in the estimation of the impact
of economic and political variables on economic success. Much of this work builds on Frankel and
Romer (1999), who studied the impact of trade openness on income per capita in a large sample
of countries. Their methodology consists of estimating a ￿rst-stage gravity equation of bilateral
trade ￿ ows, which includes indexes of geographic characteristics (size of area, whether a country
is landlocked, and whether the two countries have a common border) and bilateral distances. The
predicted trade volume from this equation is then used as a measure of trade openness in a second-
stage equation that estimates the impact of trade openness on income per capita. They found a
large and signi￿cant e⁄ect.2
Hall and Jones (1999) used instrumental variables to estimate the impact of social infrastructure
on income per capita. They combined an index of government anti-diversion policies and the
fraction of years in which a country was open according to the Sachs and Warner (1995) index
to measure social infrastructure.3 Among the instruments they included the Frankel and Romer
(1999) measure of trade openness. Evidently, the accuracy of the estimates from the Frankel￿ Romer
￿rst-stage equation a⁄ects the accuracy of the estimates in the second-stage equation, including
the marginal impact of social infrastructure on income per capita.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) also used instrumental variables to estimate the impact of political
institutions on productivity and growth. They found that in well-established democracies economic
policies are more growth-oriented in presidential than in parliamentary systems, while in weak
democracies economic policies are more growth-oriented in parliamentary systems. Similarly to
1See, for example, Anderson (1979) , Helpman and Krugman (1985), Helpman (1987), Feenstra (2002), and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
2In the working paper that preceded the published version of their paper, Frankel and Romer (1996) used the
same methodology to study the impact of openness on the rate of growth of income per capita. They found a strong
positive e⁄ect.
3The index of government anti-diversion policies aggregates measures of law and order, bureaucratic quality,
corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts.
1Hall and Jones (1999), they used the Frankel￿ Romer instrument of trade openness to reach this
conclusion. Therefore, in this case too, the quality of the ￿rst-stage gravity equation a⁄ects the
quality of the second-stage estimates of the impact of political institutions on economic performance.
These examples illustrate the prominent role of the gravity equation in areas other than inter-
national trade. In the area of international trade this equation has dominated empirical research.
It has been used to estimate the impact on trade ￿ ows of international borders, preferential trading
blocs, currency unions, membership in the WTO, as well as the size of home-market e⁄ects.4
All the above mentioned studies estimate the gravity equation on samples of countries that have
only positive trade ￿ ows between them. We argue in this paper that, by disregarding countries
that do not trade with each other, these studies give up important information contained in the
data, and they produce biased estimates as a result. We also argue that standard speci￿cations of
the gravity equation impose symmetry that is inconsistent with the data, and that this too biases
the estimates. To correct these biases, we develop a theory that predicts positive as well as zero
trade ￿ ows between countries, and use the theory to derive estimation procedures that exploit the
information contained in data sets of trading and non-trading countries alike.5
The next section brie￿ y reviews the evolution of the volume of trade among the 158 countries in
our sample, and the composition of country pairs according to their trading status.6 Three features
stand out. First, about half of the country pairs do not trade with one-another.7 Second, the rapid
growth of world trade from 1970 to 1997 was predominantly due to the growth of the volume of
trade among countries that traded with each other in 1970 rather than due to the expansion of
trade among new trade partners.8 Third, the average volume of trade at the end of the period
between pairs of countries that exported to one-another in 1970 was much larger than the average
volume of trade at the end of the period of country pairs with a di⁄erent trade status. Nevertheless,
we show in Section 6 that the volume of trade between pairs of countries that traded with one-
another was signi￿cantly in￿ uenced by the fraction of ￿rms that engaged in foreign trade, and that
this fraction varied systematically with country characteristics. Therefore the intensive margin of
trade was substantially driven by variations in the fraction of trading ￿rms, but not by new trading
partners.9
4See McCallum (1995) for the study that triggered an extensive debate on the role of international borders, as well
as Wei (1996), Evans (2003), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Feenstra (2003, chap. 5) provides an overview
of this debate. Also see Frankel (1997) on preferential trading blocs, Rose (2000) and Tenreyro and Barro (2002)
on currency unions, Rose (2004) on WTO membership, and Davis and Weinstein (2003) on the size of home-market
e⁄ects.
5Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Evenett and Venables (2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004) all highlight
the prevalence of zero bilateral trade ￿ ows and suggest theoretical interpretations for them. We provide a theoretical
framework that jointly determines both the set of trading partners and their trade volumes, and we develop estimation
procedures for this model.
6See appendix A for data sources.
7We say that a country pair i and j does not trade with one-another if i does not export to j and j does not
export to i.
8Felbermayr and Kohler (2005) report that prior to 1970 new trade ￿ ows contributed substantially to the growth
of world trade.
9The role of the number of exported products, as opposed to exports per product, has been found to be important
2We develop in Section 3 the theoretical model that motivates our estimation procedures. This
is a model of international trade in di⁄erentiated products in which ￿rms face ￿xed and variable
costs of exporting, along the lines suggested by Melitz (2003). Firms vary by productivity, and only
the more productive ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to export. Moreover, the pro￿tability of exports varies
by destination; it is higher to countries with higher demand levels, lower variable export costs, and
lower ￿xed export costs. As a result, to every destination country i; there is a marginal exporter in
country j that just breaks even by exporting to i. Country j ￿rms with higher productivity than
the marginal exporter have positive pro￿ts from exporting to i.
This model has a number of implications for trade ￿ ows. First, it allows all ￿rms in a country
j to choose not to export to a country i, because it is possible for no ￿rm in j to have productivity
above the threshold that makes exports to i pro￿table. The model is therefore able to predict zero
exports from j to i for some country pairs. As a result, the model is consistent with zero trade ￿ ows
in both directions between some countries, as well as zero exports from j to i but positive exports
from i to j for some country pairs. Both types of trade patterns exist in the data. Second, the
model predicts positive trade ￿ ows in both directions for some country pairs, which is also needed
in order to explain the data. And ￿nally, the model generates a gravity equation.
Our derivation of the gravity equation generalizes the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) equa-
tion in two ways. First, it accounts for ￿rm heterogeneity and ￿xed trade costs. Second, it accounts
for asymmetries between the volume of exports from j to i and the volume of exports from i to
j. Both are important for data analysis. We also develop a set of su¢ cient conditions under
which more general forms of the Anderson-van Wincoop equations aggregate trade ￿ ows across
heterogeneous ￿rms facing both ￿xed and variable trade costs.
Section 4 develops the empirical framework for estimating the gravity equation derived in Section
3. We propose a two stage estimation procedure. The ￿rst stage consists of estimating a Probit
equation that speci￿es the probability that country j exports to i as a function of observable
variables. The speci￿cation of this equation is derived from the theoretical model and an explicit
introduction of unobservable variations. Predicted components of this equation are then used in
the second stage to estimate the gravity equation in log-linear form. We show that this procedure
yields consistent estimates of the parameters of the gravity equation, such as the marginal impact
of distance between countries on their exports to one-another.10 It simultaneously corrects for
two types of potential biases: a Heckman selection bias and a bias from potential asymmetries
in the trade ￿ ows between pairs of countries. The latter bias is due to an omitted variable that
measures the impact of the number (fraction) of exporting ￿rms, i.e., the extensive margin of trade.
Since this procedure is easy to implement, it can be e⁄ectively used in many applications, such as
in a number of studies. To illustrate, Hummels and Klenow (2005) ￿nd that 60 percent of the greater export of
larger economies in their sample of 126 exporting countries is due to variation in the number of exported products,
and Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) ￿nd that during episodes of trade liberalization in 18 countries a large fraction of trade
expansion was driven by trade in goods that were not traded before.
10We also show that consistency requires the use of separate country ￿xed e⁄ects for exporters and importers, as
proposed by Feenstra (2002).
3instrumental variables estimation of the impact of political variables on economic outcomes.
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that our theoretical model has ￿rm heterogeneity,
we do not need ￿rm-level data to estimate the gravity equation. This stems from the fact that
the features of marginal exporters can be identi￿ed from the variation in the characteristics of the
destination countries. That is, for every country j, its exports to di⁄erent countries vary by the
characteristics of the importers. As a result, there exist su¢ cient statistics, which can be computed
from aggregate data, that predict the volume of exports of heterogeneous ￿rms.11
Section 5 shows that variables that are commonly used in gravity equations also a⁄ect the
probability that two countries trade with each other. This provides evidence for a potential bias
in the standard estimates. The extent of this bias is then studied in Sections 6 and 7. In Section
6 we implement a parametric version of the two-stage procedure developed in Section 4, using
functional forms derived from the theoretical model under the assumption that productivity follows
a truncated Pareto distribution. We show that the corrections for the selection and omitted variable
biases have a measurable downward impact on the estimated coe¢ cients. Moreover, the extent of
this bias is not sensitive to the use of alternative excluded variables. The nature and extent of
this bias is further con￿rmed in Section 7, where we estimate the model in two alternative ways.
Once with a semi-parametric method, in which we replace the truncated Pareto distribution with
a general distribution and approximate the functional form of the omitted variable with a general
polynomial. And second with a non-parametric method, in which we gather the predictions of the
￿rst stage probabilities of trading into a large number of bins and then use these bins in the second
stage. The non-parametric method allows us to relax the assumption that the residuals of the two
equations are jointly Normally distributed, with no signi￿cant impact on the main results.
A number of additional insights from our estimates are discussed in Section 8. First, we show
that most of the bias is due to the omitted variable that can account for asymmetric trade ￿ ows
across country pairs, and not due to the selection bias. In fact, the selection bias is empirically
small, despite the fact that the impact of the Mills ratio on the second stage equation is statistically
signi￿cant. Second, we show that the asymmetric impact of the extensive margin of trade is
important in explaining the asymmetries in trade ￿ ows observed in the data. Finally, and most
importantly, we show that not only is the size of the bias large, but that it varies systematically
with the characteristics of trade partners. For this purpose we perform a counterfactual exercise in
which trade frictions are reduced. A reduction in these frictions introduces trade among country
pairs that did not trade before, and it raises trade volumes among country pairs that did trade
before. When countries are grouped into high- and low-income countries, we ￿nd that the impact
11Eaton and Kortum (2002) apply a similar principle to determine an aggregate gravity equation across hetero-
geneous Ricardian sectors. As in our model, the predicted trade volume re￿ ects an extensive margin (number of
sectors/goods traded) and an intensive one (volume of trade per good/sector). However, Eaton and Kortum do not
model ￿xed trade costs and the possibility of zero bilateral trade ￿ ows. Unlike our equations, theirs are subject
to the criticism raised by Haveman and Hummels (2004). Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) use direct
information on U.S. plant-level sales, productivity, and export status to calibrate a model which is then used to
simulate the extensive and intensive margins of bilateral trade ￿ ows.


























Figure 1: Distribution of country pairs among pairs trading in both directions, pairs trading in one
direction only, and nontrading pairs, constructed form 158 countries, 1970-1997.
of reduced trade frictions di⁄ers across country pairs according to their income per capita. The
elasticity of trade with respect to such frictions can vary by a factor of three, i.e., it can be three
times larger for some country pairs than for others. This shows that not only is there a bias, but
that the bias is large and it varies substantially across countries. Section 9 concludes.
2 A Glance at the Data
Figure 1 depicts the empirical extent of zero trade ￿ ows. In this ￿gure, all possible country pairs
are partitioned into three categories: the top portion represents the fraction of country pairs that
do not trade with one-another; the bottom portion represents those that trade in both directions
(they export to one-another); and the middle portion represents those that trade in one direction
only (one country imports from, but does not export to, the other country). As is evident from the
￿gure, by disregarding countries that do not trade with each other or trade only in one direction
one disregards close to half of the observations. We show below that these observations contain
useful information for estimating international trade ￿ ows.12
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the aggregate real volume of exports of all 158 countries in our
sample, and of the aggregate real volume of exports of the subset of country pairs that exported
to one-another in 1970. The di⁄erence between the two curves represents the volume of trade of
country pairs that either did not trade in 1970 or traded in 1970 in one direction only. It is clear
12Silva and Tenreyro (2006) also argue that zero trade ￿ ows can be used in the estimation of the gravity equation,
but they emphasize a heteroskedasticity bias that emanates from the log-linearization of the equation rather than
the selection and asymmetry biases that we emphasize. Moreover, the Poisson method that they propose to use
yields similar estimates on the sample of countries that have positive trade ￿ ows in both directions and the sample























All Trade in both direction
Figure 2: Aggregate volumes of exports, measured in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars, of all country
pairs and of country pairs that traded in both directions in 1970, 1970-1997.
from this ￿gure that the rapid growth of trade, at an annual rate of 7.5% on average, was mostly
driven by the growth of trade between countries that traded with each other in both directions at
the beginning of the period. In other words, the contribution to the growth of trade of countries
that started to trade after 1970 in either one or both directions, was relatively small.
Combining this evidence with the evidence from Figure 1, which shows a relatively slow growth
of the fraction of trading country pairs, suggests that bilateral trading volumes of country pairs
that traded with one-another in both directions at the beginning of the period must have been
much larger than the bilateral trading volumes of country pairs that either did not trade with each
other or traded in one direction only at the beginning of the period. Indeed, at the end of the
period the average bilateral trade volume of country pairs of the former type was about 35 times
larger than the average bilateral trade volume of country pairs of the latter type. This suggests
that the enlargement of the set of trading countries did not contribute in a major way to the growth
of world trade.13
13This contrasts with the sector-level evidence presented by Evenett and Venables (2002). They ￿nd a substantial
increase in the number of trading partners at the 3-digit sector level for a selected group of 23 developing countries.
We conjecture that their country sample is not representative and that most of their new trading pairs were originally
trading in other sectors. And this also contrasts with the ￿nding that changes in the number of trading products has
a measurable impact on trade ￿ ows (see Hummels and Klenow 2005 and Kehoe and Ruhl 2002).
63 Theory
Consider a world with J countries, indexed by j = 1;2;:::;J. Every country consumes and produces






, 0 < ￿ < 1 ,
where xj (l) is its consumption of product l and Bj is the set of products available for consumption
in country j. The parameter ￿ determines the elasticity of substitution across products, which is
" = 1=(1 ￿ ￿). This elasticity is the same in every country.
Let Yj be the income of country j, which equals its expenditure level. Then country j￿ s demand














This speci￿cation implies that every product has a constant demand elasticity ".
Some of the products consumed in country j are domestically produced while others are im-
ported. Country j has a measure Nj of ￿rms, each one producing a distinct product. The products
produced by country-j ￿rms are also distinct from the products produced by country-i ￿rms for
i 6= j. As a result, there are
PJ
j=1 Nj products in the world economy.
A country-j ￿rm produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing combination of inputs
that cost cja, where a measures the number of bundles of the country￿ s inputs used by the ￿rm
per unit output and cj measures the cost of this bundle. The cost cj is country speci￿c, re￿ ecting
di⁄erences across countries in factor prices, whereas a is ￿rm-speci￿c, re￿ ecting productivity dif-
ferences across ￿rms in the same country. The inverse of a, 1=a, represents the ￿rm￿ s productivity
level.14 We assume that a cumulative distribution function G(a) with support [aL;aH] describes
the distribution of a across ￿rms, where aH > aL > 0. This distribution function is the same in all
countries.15
We assume that a producer bears only production costs when selling in the home market. That
is, if a country-j producer with coe¢ cient a sells in country j, the delivery cost of its product is
cja. If, however, this same producer seeks to sell its product in country i, there are two additional
costs it has to bear: a ￿xed cost of serving country i, which equals cjfij, and a transport cost. As
14See Melitz (2003) for a discussion of a general equilibrium model of trading countries in which ￿rms are hetero-
geneous in productivity. We follow his speci￿cation.
15The as only capture relative productivity di⁄erences across ￿rms in a country. Aggregate productivity di⁄erences
across countries are subsumed in the cjs.
7is customary, we adopt the ￿ melting iceberg￿speci￿cation and assume that ￿ij units of a product
have to be shipped from country j to i in order for one unit to arrive. We assume that fjj = 0 for
every j and fij > 0 for i 6= j, and ￿jj = 1 for every j and ￿ij > 1 for i 6= j. Note that the ￿xed
cost coe¢ cients fij and the transport cost coe¢ cients ￿ij depend on the identity of the importing
and exporting countries, but not on the identity of the exporting producer. In particular, they do
not depend on the producer￿ s productivity level.
There is monopolistic competition in ￿nal products. Since every producer of a distinct product
is of measure zero, the demand function (1) implies that a country-j producer with an input





This is a standard markup pricing equation, with the markup being smaller the larger the demand
elasticity of demand. It follows that if the country-j producer of product l has the input coe¢ cient
a and it sells its product in the home market, the home market consumer pays ^ pj (l) = cja=￿. If,
however, it sells the product in a foreign country i, the consumers in i are charged ^ pi (l) = ￿ijcja=￿.
As a result, the producer￿ s operating pro￿ts from selling in country i are





Yi ￿ cjfij :
Evidently, these operating pro￿ts are positive for sales in the domestic market, because fjj = 0.
Therefore all Nj producers sell in country j. But sales in country i 6= j are pro￿table only if a ￿ aij,






Yi = cjfij : (4)
It follows that only a fraction G(aij) of country j￿ s Nj ￿rms export to country i. For this reason
the set Bi of products that are available in country i is smaller than the set of products available in
the world economy. In particular, no ￿rm from country j exports to country i if aij is smaller than
aL, i.e., if the least productive ￿rm that can pro￿tably export to country i has a coe¢ cient a that
is below the support of G(a). We explicitly consider these cases, that explain zero bilateral trade
volumes. If aij were larger than aH, then all ￿rms from country j would export to i. However,
given the pervasive ￿rm-level evidence on the coexistence of exporting and non-exporting ￿rms,
even within narrowly de￿ned sectors, we disregard this possibility.
We next characterize bilateral trade volumes. Let
Vij =
( R aij
aL a1￿"dG(a) for aij ￿ aL
0 otherwise
. (5)
16Note that aij ! +1 as fij ! 0.
8Then the demand function (1) and the pricing equation (3) imply that the value of country i￿ s







This bilateral trade volume equals zero when aij ￿ aL, because under these circumstances Vij = 0.









Equations (4)-(7) provide a mapping from the income levels Yi, the numbers of ￿rms Ni, the unit
costs ci, the ￿xed costs fij, and the transport costs ￿ij, to the bilateral trade ￿ ows Mij.
We show in Appendix B that, together with equality of income and expenditure, equations (4)-
(7) can be used to derive a generalization of Anderson and van Wincoop￿ s (2003) gravity equation
that embodies third-country e⁄ects. Their equation applies when transport costs are symmetric,
i.e., ￿ij = ￿ji for all country pairs, and the variables Vij can be multiplicatively decomposed into
three components: one that depends only on importer characteristics, a second that depends only
on exporter characteristics, and a third that depends on the country pair characteristics but is
symmetric across country pairs, so that it is the same for i￿ j as for j￿ i. This decomposability holds
in Anderson and van Wincoop￿ s model. Importantly, however, there are other cases of interest,
less restrictive than the Anderson and van Wincoop speci￿cation, that satisfy them too. Therefore,
our equation applies under wider circumstances, and in particular, when there is productivity
heterogeneity across ￿rms and ￿rms bear ￿xed costs of exporting. Under these circumstances
only a fraction of the ￿rms export; those with the highest productivity. Finally, note that our
formulation is more relevant for empirical analysis, because, unlike previous formulations, it enables
bilateral trade ￿ ows to equal zero. This ￿ exibility is important because, as we have explained in
the introduction, there are many zero bilateral trade ￿ ows in the data.
In order to gain as much ￿ exibility as possible in the empirical application, we develop in the
next section an estimation procedure that builds directly on equations (4)-(7), which allow for
asymmetric bilateral trade ￿ ows, including zeros.
4 Empirical Framework
We begin by formulating a fully parametrized estimation procedure for this model, which delivers
our benchmark results. We then progressively loosen these parametric restrictions and re-estimate
the model. In all cases, we obtain similar results that are consistent with the analysis of the baseline
scenario.
In the baseline speci￿cation, we assume that ￿rm productivity 1=a is distributed Pareto, trun-











, k > (" ￿ 1). As
previously highlighted, we allow for aij < aL for some i ￿ j pairs, inducing zero exports from j to
i (i.e. Vij = 0 and Mij = 0). This framework also allows for asymmetric trade ￿ ows, Mij 6= Mji,
which may also be unidirectional, with Mji > 0 and Mij = 0, or Mji = 0 and Mij > 0. Such uni-
directional trading relationships are empirically common and can be predicted using our empirical
method. Moreover, asymmetric trade frictions are not necessary to induce such asymmetric trade
￿ ows when productivity is drawn from a truncated Pareto distribution.



















and aij is determined by the zero pro￿t condition (4). Note that both Vij and Wij are monotonic
functions of the proportion of exporters from j to i, G(aij). The export volume from j to i, given
by (6), can now be expressed in log-linear form as
mij = (" ￿ 1)ln￿ ￿ (" ￿ 1)lncj + nj + (" ￿ 1)pi + yi + (1 ￿ ")ln￿ij + vij;
where lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of their respective uppercase variables.
￿ij captures variable trade costs; costs that a⁄ect the volume of ￿rm-level exports. We assume
that these costs are stochastic due to i.i.d. unmeasured trade frictions uij, which are country-pair
speci￿c. In particular, let ￿"￿1
ij ￿ D
￿
ije￿uij, where Dij represents the (symmetric) distance between
i and j, and uij ￿ N(0;￿2
u):17 Then the equation of the bilateral trade ￿ ows mij yields the following
estimating equation:
mij = ￿0 + ￿j + ￿i ￿ ￿dij + wij + uij; (9)
where ￿i = (" ￿ 1)pi + yi is a ￿xed e⁄ect of the importing country and ￿j = ￿(" ￿ 1)lncj + nj is
a ￿xed e⁄ect of the exporting country.18
The estimating equation (9) highlights several important di⁄erences with the gravity equation,
as derived, for example, by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The most important di⁄erence is the
addition in our formulation of the new variable wij, that controls for the fraction of ￿rms (possibly
zero) that export from j to i. This variable is a function of the cuto⁄ aij, which is determined
by other explanatory variables (see (4)). When wij is not included on the right-hand-side, the
17In the following derivations, we use distance as the only source of observable variable trade costs. It should
nevertheless be clear how this approach generalizes to a matrix of observable bilateral trade frictions paired with a
vector of elasticities ￿:
18We replace vij with wij, and therefore ￿0 now also contains the log of the constant multiplier in Vij. If tari⁄s
are not directly controlled for, then the importer￿ s ￿xed e⁄ect will subsume an average tari⁄ level. Similarly, average
export taxes will show up in the exporter￿ s ￿xed e⁄ect.
10coe¢ cient ￿ on distance (or any other coe¢ cient on a potential trade barrier) can no longer be
interpreted as the elasticity of a ￿rm￿ s trade with respect to distance (or other trade barriers),
which is the way in which such trade barriers are almost always modeled in the literature that
follows the ￿new￿trade theory. Instead, the estimation of the standard gravity equation confounds
the e⁄ects of trade barriers on ￿rm-level trade with their e⁄ects on the proportion of exporting
￿rms, which induces an upward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient ￿.
Another bias is introduced in the estimation of equation (9) when country pairs with zero trade
￿ ows are excluded. This selection e⁄ect induces a positive correlation between the unobserved
uijs and the trade barrier dijs; country pairs with large observed trade barriers (high dij) that
trade with each other are likely to have low unobserved trade barriers (high uij). Although this
induces a downward bias in the trade barrier coe¢ cient, our empirical results show that this e⁄ect
is dominated by the upward bias generated by the endogenous number of exporters.
Lastly, we emphasize again that in our formulation bilateral trade ￿ ows need not be balanced,
even when all bilateral trade barriers are symmetric. First, the variables wij can be asymmetric.
Second, the ￿xed e⁄ects of importers may di⁄er from the ￿xed e⁄ects of exporters. This substanti-
ates the use of export ￿ ows and separate ￿xed e⁄ects as an exporter and as an importer, for every
country.
Firm Selection Into Export Markets
The selection of ￿rms into export markets, represented by the variable Wij; is determined by the
cuto⁄ value of aij, which is implicitly de￿ned by the zero pro￿t condition (4). We de￿ne a related












This is the ratio of variable export pro￿ts for the most productive ￿rm (with productivity 1=aL)
to the ￿xed export costs (common to all exporters) for exports from j to i. Positive exports
are observed if and only if Zij > 1: In this case Wij is a monotonic function of Zij, i.e., Wij =
Z
(k￿"+1)=("￿1)
ij ￿1 (see (4) and (8)). As with the variable trade costs ￿ij, we assume that the ￿xed
export costs fij are stochastic due to unmeasured trade frictions ￿ij that are i.i.d., but may be
correlated with the uijs. Let fij ￿ exp
￿
￿EX;j + ￿IM;i + ￿￿ij ￿ ￿ij
￿
, where ￿ij ￿ N(0;￿2
￿), ￿IM;i
is a ￿xed trade barrier imposed by the importing country on all exporters, ￿EX;j is a measure
of ￿xed export costs common across all export destinations, and ￿ij is an observed measure of
any additional country-pair speci￿c ￿xed trade costs.19 Using this speci￿cation together with
(" ￿ 1)ln￿ij ￿ ￿dij ￿ uij; the latent variable zij ￿ lnZij can be expressed as
zij = ￿0 + ￿j + ￿i ￿ ￿dij ￿ ￿￿ij + ￿ij; (11)
19As with variable trade costs, it should be clear how this derivation can be extended to a vector of observable
￿xed trade costs.
11where ￿ij ￿ uij +￿ij ￿ N(0;￿2
u +￿2
￿) is i.i.d. (yet correlated with the error term uij in the gravity
equation), ￿j = ￿"lncj + ￿EX;j are ￿xed e⁄ects of exporters, and ￿i = (" ￿ 1)pi + yi ￿ ￿IM;i
are ￿xed-e⁄ects of importers. Although zij is unobserved, we observe the presence of trade ￿ ows.
Therefore zij > 0 when j exports to i and zij = 0 when it does not. Moreover, the value of zij
a⁄ects the export volume.
De￿ne the indicator variable Tij to equal 1 when country j exports to i and 0 when it does not.
Let ￿ij be the probability that j exports to i, conditional on the observed variables. Since we do
not want to impose ￿2
￿ ￿ ￿2
u + ￿2
￿ = 1, we divide (11) by the standard deviation ￿￿, and specify
the following Probit equation:





i ￿ ￿￿dij ￿ ￿￿￿ij
￿
; (12)
where ￿(￿) is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution, and every starred coe¢ cient represents the
original coe¢ cient divided by ￿￿:20 Importantly, this selection equation has been derived from a
￿rm-level decision, and it therefore does not contain the unobserved and endogenous variable Wij
that is related to the fraction of exporting ￿rms. Moreover, the Probit equation can be used to
derive consistent estimates of Wij.
Let ^ ￿ij be the predicted probability of exports from j to i, using the estimates from the Probit
equation (12), and let ^ z￿
ij = ￿￿1 ￿
^ ￿ij
￿
be the estimated latent variable z￿
ij ￿ zij=￿￿. Then, a








where ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (k ￿ " + 1)=(" ￿ 1).
Consistent Estimation of the Log-Linear Equation
Consistent estimation of (9) requires controls for both the endogenous number of exporters (via wij)
and the selection of country pairs into trading partners (which generates a correlation between the
unobserved uij and the independent variables). We thus need estimates for E [wij j :;Tij = 1] and
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ij has a unit Normal distribution, a consistent estimate ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij is
obtained from the inverse Mills ratio, i.e., ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij = ￿(^ z￿
ij)=￿(^ z￿
ij). Therefore ^ ￿ z￿
ij ￿ ^ z￿
ij + ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij is a
consistent estimate for E
h
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estimate for E [wij j :;Tij = 1] (see (13)). We therefore can estimate (9) using the transformation












+ ￿u￿^ ￿ ￿￿
ij + eij; (14)
20By construction, the error term ￿
￿
ij ￿ ￿ij=￿￿ is distributed unit-normal. The Probit equation (12) distinguishes
between observable trade barriers that a⁄ect variable trade costs (dij) and ￿xed trade costs (fij). In practice, some
variables may a⁄ect both. Their coe¢ cients in (12) then capture the combined e⁄ect of these barriers.




(￿u=￿￿) and eij is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term satisfying
E [eij j :;Tij = 1] = 0. Since (14) is non-linear in ￿, we estimate it using maximum likelihood
(maintaining the normality assumption for eij).
The use of ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij to control for E [uij j :;Tij = 1] is the standard Heckman (1979) correction for
sample selection. This addresses the biases generated by the unobserved country-pair level shocks
uij and ￿ij, but this does not correct for the biases generated by the underlying unobserved ￿rm-
level heterogeneity. The latter biases are corrected by the additional control ^ z￿
ij (along with the
functional form determined by our theoretical assumptions). Used alone, the standard Heckman
(1979) correction would only be valid in a world without ￿rm-level heterogeneity, or where such
heterogeneity is not correlated with the export decision. Then, all ￿rms are identically a⁄ected by
trade barriers and country characteristics, and make the same export decisions ￿ or make export
decisions that are uncorrelated with trade barriers and country characteristics. This misses the
potentially important e⁄ect of trade barriers and country characteristics on the share of exporting
￿rms. In a world with ￿rm-level heterogeneity, a larger fraction of ￿rms export to more ￿attractive￿
export destinations.21 Our empirical results highlight the overwhelming contribution of this channel
relative to the standard correction for sample selection, which ignores ￿rm-level heterogeneity.
Before describing these results, we pause to note that our distributional assumptions on the
joint normality of the unobserved trade costs and the Pareto distribution of ￿rm-level productivity,
a⁄ect the functional form of the trade ￿ ow equation (14), as well as the distribution of its error
term. After presenting our main results, we will describe a number of alternative speci￿cations that
relax these assumptions, yet generate very similar empirical results. They illustrate the robustness
of the ￿ndings in our baseline speci￿cation.
5 Traditional Estimates
Traditional estimates of the gravity equation use data on country pairs that trade in at least
one direction. The ￿rst column in Table 1 provides a representative estimate of this sort, for 1986.
Note that instead of constructing symmetric trade ￿ ows by combining exports and imports for each
country pair, we use the unidirectional trade value and introduce both importing and exporting
country ￿xed e⁄ect. With these ￿xed e⁄ects every country pair can be represented twice: one
time for exports from i to j and another time for exports from j to i. Nevertheless, the results in
Table 1 are similar to those obtained with symmetric trade ￿ ows and a unique country ￿xed e⁄ect.
They show that country j exports more to country i when the two countries are closer to each
other, they both belong to the same regional free trade agreement (FTA), they share a common
language, they have a common land border, they are not islands, they share the same legal system,
they share the same currency, and if one country has colonized the other. The probability that
two randomly drawn persons, one from each country, share the same religion does not a⁄ect export
21Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) ￿nd that more French ￿rms export to larger foreign markets, and Bernard,
Bradford and Schott (2005) ￿nd a similar pattern for U.S. ￿rms. Our model is consistent with these ￿ndings.
13volumes. Details on the construction of the variables are provided in the appendix.
Among the 158 countries with available data, there are 24,806 possible bilateral export rela-
tionships. However, only 11,146 of these relationships have non-zero exports. We then estimate
a Probit equation for the presence of a trading relationship using the same explanatory variables
as the initial gravity speci￿cation (the speci￿cation follows (12), with exporter and importer ￿xed
e⁄ects).22 The results are reported in column 2, along with the marginal e⁄ects evaluated at the
sample means. These results clearly show that the very same variables that impact export volumes
from j to i also impact the probability that j exports to i. In almost all cases, the impact goes in
the same direction. The e⁄ect of a common border is the only exception: it raises the volume of
trade but reduces the probability of trading. We attribute this ￿nding to the e⁄ect of territorial
border con￿ icts that suppress trade between neighbors. In the absence of such con￿ icts, common
land borders enhance trade. We also note that a common religion strongly a⁄ects the formation of
trading relationships (its e⁄ect is almost as large as that for a common language), yet its e⁄ect on
trade volumes is negligible. Overall, this evidence strongly suggests that disregarding the selection
equation of trading partners biases the estimates of the export equation, as we have argued in
Section 4.
These results, and their consequences, are not speci￿c to 1986. We repeat the same regressions
increasing the sample years to cover all of the 1980s, adding year ￿xed e⁄ects. The results in
columns 3 and 4 are very similar to those in the ￿rst two columns. As expected, the standard
errors are reduced (all standard errors are robust to clustering by country pairs). Adding the time
variation also allows the identi￿cation of the e⁄ects of changing country characteristics. We use
this additional source of variation to investigate the e⁄ects of WTO/GATT membership (hereafter
summarized as WTO) on trade volumes as well as the formation of bilateral trade relationships. We
thus repeat the same regressions for the 1980s, adding bilateral controls whenever both countries
or neither country is a member of WTO. As emphasized by Subramanian and Wei (2003), the use
of unidirectional trade data and separate exporter and importer ￿xed e⁄ects substantially increases
the statistically signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of WTO membership on trade volumes.23 Our theoretical
framework provides the justi￿cation for this estimation strategy when bilateral trade ￿ ows are
asymmetric. Furthermore, we also ￿nd that WTO membership has a very strong and signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the formation of bilateral trading relationships. The coe¢ cients in column 6 show that,
for any country pair, joint WTO membership has a similar impact on the probability of trade as a
common language or colonial ties.
22Congo exports nowhere in 1986, so its export ￿xed e⁄ect is not identi￿ed, and all observations for potential
Congolese exports (but not imports) are dropped, leaving us with the reported 24,649 observations.
23Rose (2004) reports a signi￿cant though smaller e⁄ect of WTO membership on trade volumes using symmetric
trade ￿ ow data and a unique set of country ￿xed e⁄ects.
146 Parametric Two-Stage Estimation
Now turn to the second-stage estimation of the trade ￿ ow equation, as proposed in Section 4.
We have already run the ￿rst-stage Probit selection equation (12), which yields the predicted

















for all country-pairs with positive trade
￿ ows.24 The former controls for the sample selection bias while the latter controls for unobserved
￿rm heterogeneity, i.e., the e⁄ect of trade frictions and country characteristics on the proportion
of exporters.
Our theoretical model suggests that trade barriers that a⁄ect ￿xed trade costs but do not
a⁄ect variable trade costs should only be used as explanatory variables in the selection equation.
Econometrically, this provides the needed exclusion restriction for identi￿cation of the second stage
trade ￿ ow equation.25 We ￿rst posit that the common religion index satis￿es these conditions.26
The advantage of this variable is that it allows us to use the entire sample of countries for estimation.
For a reduced set of countries we then construct a bilateral variable from data on costs of forming
new ￿rms, which provides a more direct measure of the ￿xed costs of trade. Although these data
limit our analysis to a smaller sample of countries, it nonetheless strongly con￿rms the results
obtained in the larger sample with common religion as the exclusion variable. That is, the choice
of exclusion variable does not materially a⁄ect the main ￿ndings.
The results from the selection equation are reproduced in the initial columns of Table 2 for both
1986 and the 1980s. We also re-run the standard ￿benchmark￿gravity equation omitting the religion
control and report the results in the next columns (they are almost identical to those in Table 1).
The following columns implement the second stage estimation by incorporating the controls for ^ ￿ w￿
ij
and ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij.27 Both the non-linear coe¢ cient ￿ for ^ ￿ w￿
ij and the linear coe¢ cient for ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij are precisely
estimated. The remaining results for the linear coe¢ cients clearly demonstrate the importance of
unmeasured heterogeneity bias when estimating the e⁄ect of trade barriers: higher trade volumes
are not just the direct consequence of lower trade barriers; they also represent a greater proportion
of exporters to a particular destination. Consequently, the measures of the e⁄ects of trade frictions






. The characteristics of our data induces a complication associated with this trans-
formation: Our sample includes a relatively small number of country pairs whose characteristics are such that their
probability of trade ^ ￿ij is indistinguishable from 1. We therefore cannot infer any di⁄erences in the ^ z
￿
ijs among this
subgroup of country pairs based on their probability of trade (whose binary realization is the only relevant data we
observe). Hence, we assign the same ^ z
￿
ij to those country pairs with an estimated ^ ￿ij > :9999999, equivalent to an
estimated ^ ￿ij at this cuto⁄. This censoring a⁄ects 5.01% of the 11,146 country pairs that trade in 1986.
25Another source of identi￿cation comes from the opposite e⁄ect of a common border in the selection and trade
volume equations.
26Alternatively, we could use the common language indicator for this purpose. This would yield nearly identical
results.
27The reported robust standard errors do not take into consideration any correction for the data generated regressors
^ ￿ w
￿
ij and ^ ￿ ￿
￿
ij. We have also computed bootstrapped standard errors (based on sampling 158 countries with replacement
and using all the potential country pairs from that country sample). Those standard errors based on 500 replications
hardly varied from the ones we report ￿and did not a⁄ect any coe¢ cient signi￿cance test at either the 1%,5%, or
10% level.
15in the benchmark gravity equation are biased upwards as they confound the true e⁄ect of these
frictions with their indirect e⁄ect on the proportion of exporting ￿rms.28 As highlighted in Table 2,
these biases are substantial. The coe¢ cient on distance drops roughly by a third, indicating a much
smaller e⁄ect of distance on ￿rm level (hence product level) trade.29 The e⁄ects of a currency union
and colonial ties on ￿rm or product level trade are also reduced by a similar proportion. The biases
for the e⁄ects of FTAs and WTO membership are even more severe as their coe¢ cients drop roughly
in half, though they both remain economically and statistically signi￿cant. The measured e⁄ect
of a common language is even more a⁄ected as it becomes insigni￿cant (and precisely estimated
around zero). This suggests that a common language predominantly reduces the ￿xed costs of
trade: it has a great in￿ uence on a ￿rm￿ s choice of export location, but not on its export volume,
once that decision is made.30
Since these results depend on the a prior assumption of the validity of the exclusion restriction,
we now describe the construction of an alternate excluded variable and examine its e⁄ect on our
second stage results. We start with country-level data on the regulation costs of ￿rm entry, collected
and analyzed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). These entry costs
are measured via their e⁄ects on the number of days, the number of legal procedures, and the
relative cost (as percent of GDP per capita) needed for an entrepreneur to legally start operating
a business.31 We surmise (and con￿rm empirically) that these regulation costs also a⁄ect the
costs faced by exporting ￿rms to/from that country, and that these costs are magni￿ed when both
exporting and importing countries impose high regulatory hurdles. By their nature, these costs
predominantly a⁄ect the ￿rm-level ￿xed costs of trade. We therefore construct an indicator for
high ￿xed-cost trading country pairs, consisting of country pairs in which both the importing and
exporting countries have entry regulation measures above the cross-country median. One variable
uses the sum of the number of days and procedures above the median (for both countries) while
the other uses the sum of the relative costs above the median (again for both countries).32 By
construction, these bilateral variables re￿ ect regulation costs that should not depend on a ￿rm￿ s
volume of exports to a particular country. These variables therefore satisfy the requisite exclusion
restrictions, and both have substantial explanatory power.33
28The e⁄ect of a land border is an exception, because it negatively a⁄ects the probability of trade.
29Several studies have documented that the e⁄ect of distance in gravity models is overstated since distance is
correlated with other trade frictions (such as lack of information). The same issue applies here, and would even
further reduce the directly measured e⁄ect of distance.
30If we had used language for the exclusion restriction, we would have obtained this result for the religion variable,
i.e., that religion has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on ￿rm-level export volumes.
31Unfortunately, historic data were not available. For this reason we use the data for 1999. See Djankov et al.
(2002) for details.
32Recall that these relative costs are measured as a percentage of GDP per capita, so these cost measures can be
compared across countries. We could also have separated the number of days and procedures into separate variables,
but we found that the jointly de￿ned indicator variable had substantially more explanatory power.
33Variable (per-unit) export costs at the country level could potentially be correlated with the ￿xed regulation
costs associated with trade. However, our ￿rst stage estimation also includes country ￿xed e⁄ects. These correlated
country-level variable costs would then have to interact in the same pattern as the ￿xed costs across country pairs
in order to generate a correlation at the country level that is left uncontrolled by the country ￿xed e⁄ects. This
16Although the use of regulation cost variables has advantages, it also has a drawback: it substan-
tially reduces the number of usable observations. This occurs for two reasons. First, the number of
countries in the sample is reduced to those with available regulation cost data, which eliminates 45
countries from the sample.34 Second, several additional country pairs have to be dropped because
in the reduced sample they export to all their trade partners or import from them (e.g., Japan
imports from all). Under these circumstances, of exporting to all trade partners or importing from
all trade partners, the ￿xed e⁄ects of exporters or importers cannot be estimated.35 As a result,
the number of potential trading pairs is reduced to about half the original number, despite the fact
that the sample of countries is reduced by about one third only.
In order to separate the e⁄ects of the sample reduction from the new ￿rst-stage variables,
we ￿rst reproduce both the benchmark gravity equation and our baseline ￿rst and second stage
estimates (with the excluded religion variable) for the reduced sample in 1986. These are shown
in the ￿rst three columns of Table 3. The results are overall very similar to the baseline case
reported in Table 2.36 We then re-estimate the ￿rst stage Probit adding the additional regulation
cost variables. The results are reported in the third column of Table 3. Both cost variables enter
signi￿cantly (their joint signi￿cance is now substantially higher), though the coe¢ cients on all the
other explanatory variables are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected. We then use these ￿rst stage estimates
for our second stage maximum likelihood estimation, adding the religion index as an explanatory
variable to the second stage equation (the cost variables are then excluded). The results are reported
in the ￿fth column (the fourth column reproduces the benchmark results for the gravity equation
with the new cost variables). Clearly, they are nearly identical to those reported in column two,
when the religion variable is excluded. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of this variable in column four
con￿rms that this variable does not have any statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the intensive margin
of trade. This validates our initial assumption concerning the validity of the exclusion restriction
for the religion variable. These results also con￿rm that a common language does not have any
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the intensive margin, and is also a valid excluded variable for the
￿rst stage.
7 Robustness to Alternative Speci￿cations
We now progressively relax the parametrization assumptions that determined our functional forms.
First, we relax the assumption governing the distribution of ￿rm heterogeneity, and hence the form
possibility is substantially more remote than the potential correlation at the country level.
34The list of excluded countries is: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman
Islands, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Eq. Guinea, Fiji, French Guian, Gabon, Gambia, Greenland, Guadeloupe,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Iraq, Kiribati, North Korea, Liberia, Libya, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Myanmar,
Neth Antilles, New Caledonia, Qatar, Reunion, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, St. Kitts, Sudan, Surinam,
Trinidad-Tobago, Turks Caicos, Western Sahara, Zaire.
35Thus, all exports for Japan, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, U.K., and Sweden are dropped
from this reduced sample, along with all imports for Japan.
36The biggest di⁄erence is re￿ ected in the FTA coe¢ cient. The ￿rst stage e⁄ect of an FTA is magni￿ed because
almost all countries in the reduced sample trade with their FTA partners.
17of the control function of ^ ￿ z￿
ij in the trade ￿ ow equation (14). That is, we drop the Pareto assumption
for G(:) and revert to the general speci￿cation for Vij in (5). Using (4) and (10), vij ￿ ￿(zij) is now
an arbitrary (increasing) function of zij. We then directly control for E[Vij j :;Tij = 1] using ￿(^ ￿ z￿
ij);
which we approximate with a polynomial in ^ ￿ z￿













baseline model.37 As the non-linearity induced by ^ ￿ w￿
ij is eliminated, we now estimate the second
stage using OLS. In practice, we have found no noticeable changes from expanding ￿(^ ￿ z￿
ij) beyond
a cubic polynomial. The results from this second stage estimation (the baseline ￿rst stage Probit
remains unchanged) are reported in the second column of Table 4 (the ￿rst column reproduces our
baseline maximum likelihood results). The results are very similar, although a few coe¢ cients are
marginally higher in the polynomial speci￿cation.38 Nevertheless, the basic message from these
results remains unchanged. In other words, the Pareto distribution does not appear to unduly
constrain our baseline speci￿cation.
We now additionally relax the joint normality assumption for the unobserved trade costs, and
hence the Mills ratio functional form for the selection correction. This naturally precludes the
separation of the e⁄ects of the latter from the ￿rm heterogeneity e⁄ects. However, we can still
jointly control for these e⁄ects with a ￿ exible non-parametric functional form, and thus obtain
our key results for the intensive-margin contribution of the various trade barriers. The ￿rst stage
estimation is still similar to the baseline case in (12), except that now we can use any cdf instead of
the Normal distribution. We have experimented with the Logit and t-distribution with various low
degrees of freedom and found that the resulting predicted probabilities ^ ￿ij are strikingly similar.
For this reason we no longer use the normality assumption to recover the ^ ￿ z￿
ij and ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij. Instead, we
work directly with the predicted probabilities ^ ￿ij.
In order to approximate as ￿ exibly as possible an arbitrary functional form of the ^ ￿ij, we
use a large set of indicator variables. We partition the obtained ^ ￿ijs into a number of bins with
equal observations, and assign an indicator variable to each bin. We then replace the ^ ￿ w￿
ij and ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij
controls from the baseline estimation (or alternatively the ^ ￿ z￿
ij polynomial and ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij from the previous
estimation) with this set of indicator variables. We report results with both 50 and 100 bins, to
ensure a large degree of ￿ exibility.39 The results are in the last two columns of Table 4. Here, we
use the predicted probabilities from the baseline Probit, but these results are virtually unchanged
when switching to a Logit or a t-distribution in the ￿rst stage. Although a few coe¢ cients are now
slightly lower (most noticeably for distance and FTA), the basic message remains unchanged. We
also note that our baseline maximum likelihood results are all in between those obtained from the
polynomial approximation (with the joint normality assumption) and these new non-parametric
results.
37Recall that wij and vij di⁄er only by a constant term.
38Again, we report the robust standard errors without correcting for the generated regressors in the second stage. As
for the maximum likelihood speci￿cation, we checked that the bootstrapped standard errors would not substantially
deviate from those reported. This was again veri￿ed and again, none of the coe¢ cient signi￿cance tests (at the 1%,
5%, or 10% levels) were a⁄ected.
39As with the polynomial approximation, this speci￿cation is now linear, and we thus use OLS.
18We further report the results from these alternate speci￿cations for the reduced sample using
both religion and the regulation costs as the excluded variables in Table 5. Using the reduced
sample, our baseline maximum likelihood results are again bounded by the polynomial and non-
parametric speci￿cations. Moreover, these bounds are now considerably narrower. These estimates
also con￿rm that the choice of excluded variable hardly a⁄ects any of the main results. Using the
excluded regulation variables, we ￿nd again that neither the religion nor the common language
variables signi￿cantly a⁄ect the intensive margin of trade ￿ ows.
8 Additional Insights
We now return to the 1986 baseline speci￿cation, and examine several aspects of the results in
further detail.
Decomposing the Biases
Our second stage estimation addresses two di⁄erent sources of bias for standard gravity equations:
a selection bias that arises from the pairing of countries into exporter-importer relationships, and
an unobserved heterogeneity bias that results from the variation in the fraction of ￿rms that export
from a source to a destination country. To examine the relative importance of these biases, we
now estimate two speci￿cations of the second-stage export equation, one controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity only, the other controlling for selection only.
The results for 1986 are reported in Table 6. The ￿rst two columns report the standard gravity
￿benchmark￿ equation and our second stage estimation from Table 2. The di⁄erences in the
estimated coe¢ cients of these two equations represent the joint outcome of the two biases. As we
discussed, all the coe¢ cients, with the exception of the land border e⁄ect, are lower in absolute value
in the second column. We then implement a simple linear correction for unobserved heterogeneity
by adding ^ z￿
ij = ￿￿1(^ ￿ij) as an additional regressor to the standard gravity speci￿cation (here, we do
not correct for the sample selection bias via ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij).40 The results reported in the third column clearly
show that this unobserved heterogeneity (the proportion of exporting ￿rms) addresses almost all
the biases in the standard gravity equation. The coe¢ cients and standard errors for all the observed
trade barriers are very similar to those obtained in our second stage non-linear estimation.
In the fourth column, we correct only for the selection bias (the standard two-stage Heckman
selection procedure) by introducing the Mills ratio ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij as an additional regressor to the benchmark
speci￿cation. Although the estimated coe¢ cient on ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij is positive and signi￿cant, the remaining
coe¢ cients are very similar to those obtained in the benchmark speci￿cation of column 1. Thus,
the bias corrections implemented in our second stage estimation are dominated by the in￿ uence
of unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity rather than sample selection. This ￿nding suggests that while
aggregate country-pair shocks do have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on trade patterns, they only negligibly
40In this exercise we want to ensure a simple monotonic transformation of ^ z
￿
ij, so we do not add any higher order
terms.
19a⁄ect the responsiveness of trade volumes to observed trade barriers.41 The results in column
3 clearly show that this is not the case for the e⁄ects of unobserved heterogeneity: the latter
would a⁄ect trade volumes even were all country pairs trading with one-another, since it operates
independently of the selection e⁄ect. Neglecting to control for this unobserved heterogeneity induces
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Figure 3: Predicted asymmetries: min(^ ￿ij;^ ￿ji) versus max(^ ￿ij;^ ￿ji).
Evidence on Asymmetric Trade Relationships
As was previously mentioned, our model predicts asymmetric trade ￿ ows between countries. These
asymmetries can be extreme, with trade predicted in only one direction, as also re￿ ected in the data.
More nuanced, trade can be positive in both directions, but with a net trade imbalance. Figure
3 graphically represents the extent of the predicted trade asymmetries by plotting the predicted
probability of export between country pairs (^ ￿ij versus ^ ￿ji). The predicted asymmetries are clearly
large, as measured by the distance from the diagonal for a substantial proportion of country pairs.
Do these predicted asymmetries have explanatory power for the direction of trade ￿ ows and net
bilateral trade balances? The answer is an overwhelming yes, as evidenced by the results reported
in Table 7. The ￿rst part of the table shows the results of the OLS regression of Tij ￿ Tji on
^ ￿ij ￿ ^ ￿ji (based on the Probit results for 1986). Note that the regressand, Tij ￿ Tji, takes on the
values ￿1; 0; 1, depending on the direction of trade between i and j (it is 0 if trade ￿ ows in both
directions or if the countries do not trade at all). The magnitude of the regressor ^ ￿ij ￿^ ￿ji measures
the model￿ s prediction for an asymmetric trading relationship, while its sign predicts the direction
41This ￿nding also highlights the important information conveyed by the non-trading country pairs. If such zero
trade values were just the outcome of censoring, then a Tobit speci￿cation would provide the best ￿t to the data.
This is just a more restrictive version of the selection model, which is rejected by the data in favor of the speci￿cation
incorporating ￿rm heterogeneity.
20of the asymmetry. Table 7 shows that the predicted asymmetries have a substantial amount of
explanatory power; the regressor coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at any conventional level and explains
on its own 23% of the variation in the direction of trade.42 We emphasize that the regressor is
constructed only from the predicted probability of export ^ ￿ij, which is a function only of country
level variables (the ￿xed e⁄ects) and symmetric bilateral measures.
The second part of Table 7 shows the results of the OLS regression of net bilateral trade
mij ￿ mji (the percentage di⁄erence between exports and imports) on ^ ￿ w￿
ij ￿ ^ ￿ w￿
ji (only for those
country pairs trading in both directions). This regressor captures di⁄erences in the proportion of
exporting ￿rms. Combined with the country ￿xed e⁄ects, these variables capture di⁄erences in the
number of exporting ￿rms from one country to the other. Again, we ￿nd that this single regressor
is a strong predictor of net bilateral trade. On its own, it explains 16% of the variance in net trade,
and along with the country ￿xed e⁄ects it explains 30% of that variance.
Counterfactuals
We have just shown how the ￿tted values for ^ ￿ij and ^ ￿ w￿
ij can explain a large portion of the variation
in the direction of trade and in its extensive margin. We next show how to use these ￿tted values
to make predictions about the response of trade to changes in trade costs. For every change in
the bilateral trade costs dij, our model predicts the new pattern of trade, i.e., who trades with
whom, and in which direction. In addition, for country pairs that trade with each other the model
predicts the resulting changes in the composition of trade ￿ ows between the extensive and intensive
margins. These counterfactual predictions can be measured, and we illustrate their quantitative
impact for a reduction in trade costs associated with distance.
In response to a drop in distance-related trade costs some countries start trading with one-
another. Trade rises for country pairs that traded before the drop in trade costs, and we report
how the increase in trade can be decomposed into the intensive and extensive margin. We ￿nd that
the extensive margin is especially important in shaping the response of trade ￿ ows across country
pairs, because it generates substantial heterogeneity across country pairs. This richness contrasts
sharply with the uniform response implied by the baseline gravity model, which does not account
for the extensive margin of trade (nor does it account for the creation of new trading relationships).
Consider an observed change in the bilateral trade costs from dij to d0
ij.43 The new predicted
estimates of the probability of trade ^ ￿0
ij and ^ z￿0
ij = ￿￿1(^ ￿0
ij) are obtained in a straightforward way
from the ￿rst stage estimated Probit equation by replacing dij with d0
ij. We next need to obtain
a consistent estimate of z￿0
ij conditional on the observed trade status of j and i (trade or no-trade)
when trade costs are dij, given that we do not observe the trade status under the new trade costs
d0
ij. This will replace ^ ￿ z￿
ij in our equations. Originally we were only concerned with computing ^ ￿ z￿
ij
for country pairs with active trade, i.e., with Tij = 1. But now we also need to consider country
42This understates the variable￿ s explanatory power, because it is continuous and it predicts a discrete variable.
43As in our previous derivations, dij can represent any given observable variable trade cost.
21pairs that do not trade under costs dij but might trade under costs d0
ij. For this reason we need to
examine two cases.
Country Pairs Observed Trading
First, we note that the unobserved trade costs ￿￿
ij are not a⁄ected by the change in trade costs dij.44
If we knew whether a country pair traded under d0
ij, say T0
ij, then we could construct a new estimate
for ￿￿
ij, say ￿￿0
ij, conditional on both Tij and T0
ij. Absent this additional information, our best
estimate for ￿￿

















Thus, when Tij = 1, our best estimate for ^ z￿0



















Again, note that the new distance cost d0
ij is used to compute the new ^ z￿0
ij but not the bias correction
for ￿￿
ij. If ^ ￿ z￿0
ij < 0, then we predict that j no longer exports to i. Since ^ ￿ z￿
ij > 0, this can only happen
when d0
ij > dij (a scenario we will not explicitly consider). If ^ ￿ z￿0
ij > 0, then we predict that
the country pair continues to trade (this must be the case when d0
ij < dij). This new value of
^ ￿ z￿0
ij can then be used in conjunction with the second stage estimates to predict the response of













(and ^ ￿(^ ￿ z￿0
ij) for the polynomial approximation). The overall predicted
trade response ^ m0
ij is given by the ￿tted value from the estimated second stage equation (14) using




ij = ^ ￿0 + ^ ￿j + ^ ￿i + ^ ￿d0
ij + ^ ￿ w￿0
ij + ^ ￿u￿^ ￿ ￿￿
ij: (15)
In the case of the polynomial approximation, ^ ￿0 + ^ ￿ w￿0
ij is replaced by ^ ￿(^ ￿ z￿0
ij).
Country Pairs Not Observed Trading
We now show how our model can be used to determine which non-trading country pairs are predicted
to start trading under costs d0
ij, and the associated new predicted trade ￿ ow. The ￿rst stage
yields a predicted ^ ￿0
ij and ^ z￿0
ij for all country pairs under d0
ij, including the non-trading country
pairs. We now need to obtain a consistent estimate for z￿0
ij for these country pairs, conditional on
Tij = 0. We start by expanding the de￿nition for ￿ ￿￿




























44That is, we seek a ceteris paribus counterfactual prediction for a direct change in dij.
22since ￿￿
ij is distributed standard Normal. Hence, ^ ￿ ￿￿



















ij) if Tij = 1:
Using this new expanded de￿nition for ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij, our previous de￿nition for ^ ￿ z￿
ij = ^ z￿
ij + ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij now provides





, which now includes the case for country pairs with Tij = 0.
Note that, by construction, ^ ￿ z￿
ij must be negative whenever Tij = 0 (recall that ^ ￿ z￿
ij > 0 whenever
Tij = 1).
When trade costs change to d0
ij, we obtain a new ^ ￿ z￿0
ij for country pairs with Tij = 0 in a similar
way as was obtained for Tij = 1: ^ ￿ z￿0
ij = ^ z￿0
ij + ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij, where we do not adjust ^ ￿ ￿￿
ij for the new value of
the trade costs.45 Whenever ^ ￿ z￿
ij > 0, our model predicts that j exports to i under the trade costs
d0
ij. For these country pairs, the new predicted trade ￿ ow ^ m0
ij can be predicted in a similar way to
all the other trading country pairs using (15) along with the newly constructed ^ ￿ z￿
ij.
Heterogeneous Country-Pair Responses to Decreases in Distance-Related Trade Costs
We now describe a particular counter-factual prediction involving a decrease in the trade costs
associated with distance. That is, we investigate the response of trade for any given country pair
assuming that the distance between those two country pairs decreases by a given percentage. We
￿rst focus on country pairs observed trading, and focus on the elasticity of the overall trade response










￿, where dij now speci￿cally references the bilateral
distance variable.46 Since our model predicts di⁄erent response elasticities with the magnitude of
the trade decrease, we report these elasticities for the case of a 10% distance decrease (d0
ij ￿ dij =
log:9), although any percentage decrease under 20% would yield virtually identical results.47
As was previously mentioned, the elasticities vary widely across di⁄erent country pairs. In order
to highlight how these elasticities vary along one important country pair dimension ￿ country
income ￿ we report summary statistics across three groups of country pairs: North-North, North-
South, and South-South, sorted by GDP per capita.48 These statistics appear in Table 8 for both
our maximum likelihood and polynomial approximation speci￿cations. Importantly, we emphasize
that all the heterogeneity in the elasticity response is driven by the extensive margin, because the
elasticity response at the intensive margin is ￿xed at .801 (maximum likelihood estimation) and
.865 (polynomial approximation). Since this extensive margin response depends fundamentally on





46To avoid any confusion when discussing ￿ larger￿versus ￿ smaller￿elasticities, we express the elasticities in absolute
value. Naturally, for the case of trade costs, these elasticities are all negative.
47Larger decreases in trade costs would produce larger elasticities, but with similar qualitative patterns across
country pairs.
48We use 1986 US $15,000 as the cuto⁄ GDP per capita between North and South. The former group is composed
of 19 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
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Figure 4: The distribution of the distance elasticity across country pairs.
the functional forms for ^ ￿ w￿0
ij or ^ ￿(^ ￿ z￿0
ij) in terms of ^ ￿ z￿0
ij, we report the elasticities for both cases.
Although the shape of the functional form for ^ ￿ w￿0
ij is in part determined by our theoretical modeling
assumptions (see (13)), the shape of the ^ ￿(^ ￿ z￿0
ij) is entirely data-driven. Reassuringly, both functions
have very similar shapes over the range of ^ ￿ z￿0
ij, and the counterfactual distributions of the response
elasticity are similar.
The substantial heterogeneous trade responses reported in Table 8 contrast sharply with the
single response elasticity predicted by the baseline gravity model.49 In the table these elasticities
vary between 1.285 and 3.780 for the maximum likelihood estimates and between 1.145 and 3.007
for the semi-parametric estimates; large variations indeed. We visually depict these distributions
across country pairs group in Figure 4. The charts clearly document how the range and distribution
of elasticities vary with country income: the elasticities are highest for South-South trade, lower for
North-South trade, and lowest for North-North trade. Thus, when trade costs related to distance
fall, our model predicts that the response of the extensive margin of trade are more important for
less developed countries.
Lastly, we focus on country pairs that do not trade and we investigate how many of them
and which pairs start trading when the trade costs fall. Again, we break down the countries by
income group and report the results in Table 9 (there are no North-North country pairs that do not
trade in 1986). The model suggests that large changes in trade-related costs are needed to induce
non-trading country pairs (involving at least one Southern country) to trade.50 Hence, we report
49Of course, departing from the log-linear speci￿cation for distance would yield di⁄erent elasticities for di⁄erent
changes in trade costs related to distance. Our main point is that, given a log-linear speci￿cation for distance in both
stages, our model still predicts substantial di⁄erences in the response elasticity, driven by the characteristics of the
country pairs that jointly determine the extensive margin of trade.
50Our model predicts that no country pair would start trading until trade costs drop below 30%. In part, this
is due to the fact that no non-trading country pair ranks relatively highly in the overall distribution of predicted
^ ￿ijs. The largest ^ ￿ij in the former group is at the 85th percentile of the distribution of ^ ￿ij among trading country
24the consequences for trading relationships of relatively large drops in trading costs, of 50% and
80%. Once again, Table 9 con￿rms that incomes of country pairs predict the formation of trading
relationships. These predictions are very much in line with the evidence presented in Figures 1
and 2, that almost all of the increase in world trade ￿ ows in the last 30 years has occurred among
countries with trading relationships in 1970.
9 Concluding Comments
Empirical explanations of international trade ￿ ows have a long tradition, and they have gained
added importance in recent years as a result of their use in the study of growth and productivity.
The gravity equation with various measures of trade resistance plays a key role in this literature.
Indeed, estimates of the impact of trade resistance measures provide important information about
the roles played by common currencies, free trade areas, membership in the WTO and other features
of trading countries. For this reason it is important to obtain reliable estimates of international
trade ￿ ows.
We develop in this paper an estimation procedure that corrects certain biases embodied in the
standard estimation of trade ￿ ows. Our approach is driven by theoretical as well as econometric
considerations. On the theory side we developed a simple model that is capable of explaining
empirical phenomena, such as zero trade ￿ ows between certain pairs of countries and larger numbers
of exporters to larger destination markets, and we derive from this theory a two-equation system
that can be estimated with standard data sets. Importantly, this system enables one to decompose
the impact on trade volumes of every trade resistance measure into its intensive and extensive
margin, where by the intensive margin we mean the impact of changes in exports of trading ￿rms
and by the extensive margin we mean the impact of changes in the number of trading ￿rms. We
then show how to obtain estimates of this decomposition without having ￿rm-level data, but rather
country level data that are normally used to estimate trade ￿ ows.51 The ability to obtain such
a decomposition is important because in practice substantial fractions of trade adjustment take
place at the extensive margin, and it is not possible to obtain consistent ￿rm-level data for a large
number of countries in order to estimate trade ￿ ows.
A variety of robustness checks show that the resulting estimates are not sensitive to the estima-
tion method (parametric, semi-parametric, or non-parametric) nor to the excluded variable from
the ￿rst stage of our two-stage estimation procedure. Moreover, these estimates suggest that the
biases embodied in the commonly used approach are substantial and that they are mostly due to
the omission to control for the extensive margin of trade. Especially important is our ￿nding that
pairs. Of course, the assumption of joint normality of the unobserved trade costs also play a substantial role in
determining the level of trade cost decrease needed to induce a country pair to begin trading. For this reason
we emphasize the distribution of the newly formed trading relationships across income groups rather than across
trade cost levels. Note that, given the joint normality assumption, both the maximum likelihood and polynomial
approximation speci￿cations yield identical predictions for the formation of trading relationships.
51Manova (2006) shows how to apply our procedure to sectoral data, and how it helps in explaining the impact of
￿nancial frictions on trade ￿ ows.
25not only is there a bias, but that the bias varies across country pairs according to their character-
istics. In particular, the response of the trade ￿ ow between one pair of countries to a reduction
in distance-related trade frictions, such as transport costs, can be as much as three times as large
as the response of the trade ￿ ow between another pair of countries to the same type of friction
reduction. And in any case, the variation across country pairs in the response to trade frictions is
driven by variation in the extensive margin.
Finally, we note that our estimation procedure is easy to implement. In addition, it is ￿ exible,
because it allows the use of parametric, semi-parametric and a non-parametric speci￿cations. In
other words, the procedure provides the researcher with ￿ exibility and convenience in individual
applications.
26Appendix A
We describe in this appendix our data sources.
Trade data
The bilateral trade ￿ ows are from Feenstra￿ s ￿World Trade Flows, 1970-1992￿and ￿World Trade
Flows, 1980-1997￿ . These data include 183 ￿country titles￿over the period 1970 to 1997. In some
cases Feenstra grouped several countries into a single title. We excluded 12 such country titles and
3 proper countries for which data other than trade ￿ ows were missing. This left usable data for
bilateral trade ￿ ows among 158 countries. The list of these countries is provided in Table A1.
For the 158 countries we constructed a matrix of trade ￿ ows, measured in constant 2000 U.S.
dollars, using the U.S. CPI. This matrix represents 158 ￿ 157 = 24;806 observations, consisting of
exports from country j to country i. Many of these export ￿ ows are zeros.
Country-level data
Population and real GDP per capita have been obtained from two standard sources: the Penn
World Tables 6.1, and the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators.
We used the CIA￿ s World Factbook to construct a number of variables, which can be classi￿ed
as follows:52
1. Geography Latitude, longitude, and whether a country is landlocked or an island.
2. Institutions Legal origin, colonial origin, GATT/WTO membership.
3. Culture Primary language and religion.
We also used data from Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002), as presented on Andrew Rose￿ s
web site, to identify whether a country pair belongs to the same currency union or the same FTA.
And we used data from Rose (2004) to identify whether a country is a member of the GATT/WTO.
Using these data, we constructed country-pair speci￿c variables, such as the distance between
countries i and j, whether they share a border, the same legal system, the same colonial origin, or
membership in the GATT/WTO (see below).
The construction of the regulation costs of ￿rm entry are described in the main text. As
previously mentioned, cost data on the number of days, number of legal procedures, and relative
cost (as percent of GDP per capita) are report in Djankov et al. (2002).
52See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/pro￿leguide.html.
27Main Variables
1. distance: the distance (in km) between importer￿ s i and exporter￿ s j capitals (in logs).
2. common border: a binary variable which equals one if importer i and exporter j are
neighbors that meet a common physical boundary, and zero otherwise.
3. island: a binary variable which equals one if both importer i and exporter j are an island,
and zero otherwise.
4. landlocked: a binary variable which equals one if both exporting country j and importing
country i have no coastline or direct access to sea, and zero otherwise.
5. colonial ties: a binary variable that equals one if importing country i ever colonized export-
ing country j or vice versa, and zero otherwise.
6. currency union: a binary variable that equals one if importing country i and exporting
country j use the same currency or if within the country pair money was interchangeable at
a 1:1 exchange rate for an extended period of time (see Rose 2000, Glick and Rose 2002 and
Rose 2004), and zero otherwise.
7. legal system: a binary variable which equals one if the importing country i and exporting
country j share the same legal origin, and zero otherwise.
8. religion: (% Protestants in country i ￿ % Protestants in country j)+(% Catholics in country
i ￿ % Catholics in country j) + (% Muslims in country i ￿ % Muslims in country j).
9. FTA: a binary variable that equals one if exporting country j and importing country i belong
to a common regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise.
10. WTO: a vector of two dummy variables: the ￿rst binary variable equals one if both exporting
country j and importing country i do not belong to the GATT/WTO, and zero otherwise;
the second binary variable equals one if both countries belong to the GATT/WTO, and zero
otherwise.
11. entry costs: a binary indicator that equals one if the sum of the number of days and
procedures to form a business is above the median for both the importing country i and
exporting country j, or if the relative cost (as percent of GDP per capita) of forming a





# Name In the Sample # Name In the Sample # Name In the Sample
1 AFGHANISTAN 1 62 FM YEMEN 0 122 NICARAGUA 1
2 ALBANIA 1 63 FM YUGOSLAVI 1 123 NIGER 1
3 ALGERIA 1 64 FR.SO.ANT.TR 0 124 NIGERIA 1
4 ANGOLA 1 65 FRANCE 1 125 NORTH AFRICA 0
5 AREAS NES 0 66 FRENCH GUIAN 1 126 NORWAY 1
6 ARGENTINA 1 67 GABON 1 127 OMAN 1
7 ASIA CPE NES 0 68 GAMBIA 1 128 OTH. OCEANIA 0
8 AUSTRALIA 1 69 GERMANY 1 129 OTHER AFRICA 0
9 AUSTRIA 1 70 GHANA 1 130 OTHER EUR NE 0
10 BAHAMAS 1 71 GIBRALTAR 0 131 PAKISTAN 1
11 BAHRAIN 1 72 GREECE 1 132 PANAMA 1
12 BANGLADESH 1 73 GREENLAND 1 133 PAPUA N.GUIN 1
13 BARBADOS 1 74 GUADELOUPE ( 1 134 PARAGUAY 1
14 BELGIUM-LUX. 1 75 GUATEMALA 1 135 PERU 1
15 BELIZE 1 76 GUINEA 1 136 PHILIPPINES 1
16 BENIN 1 77 GUINEA-BISSA 1 137 POLAND 1
17 BERMUDA 1 78 GUYANA 1 138 PORTUGAL 1
18 BHUTAN 1 79 HAITI 1 139 QATAR 1
19 BOLIVIA 1 80 HONDURAS 1 140 REST AMERICA 0
20 BR.IND.OC.TR 0 81 HONG KONG 1 141 REUNION 1
21 BRAZIL 1 82 HUNGARY 1 142 ROMANIA 1
22 BRUNEI 1 83 ICELAND 1 143 RWANDA 1
23 BULGARIA 1 84 INDIA 1 144 SAUDI ARABIA 1
24 BURKINA FASO 1 85 INDONESIA (i 1 145 SENEGAL 1
25 BURUNDI 1 86 IRAN 1 146 SEYCHELLES 1
26 CACM NES 0 87 IRAQ 1 147 SIERRA LEONE 1
27 CAMBODIA 1 88 IRELAND 1 148 SINGAPORE 1
28 CAMEROON 1 89 ISRAEL 1 149 SOLOMON ISLD 1
29 CANADA 1 90 ITALY 1 150 SOMALIA 1
30 CARIBBEAN NE 0 91 JAMAICA 1 151 SOUTH AFRICA 1
31 CAYMAN ISLDS 1 92 JAPAN 1 152 SPAIN 1
32 CENTRAL AFR. 1 93 JORDAN 1 153 SRI LANKA 1
33 CEUCA NES 0 94 KENYA 1 154 ST KITTS NEV 1
34 CHAD 1 95 KIRIBATI (in 1 155 ST PIERRE MI 0
35 CHILE 1 96 KOREA D P RP 1 156 ST.HELENA 0
36 CHINA 1 97 KOREA RP (SO 1 157 SUDAN 1
37 COLOMBIA 1 98 KUWAIT 1 158 SURINAM 1
38 COMOROS 1 99 LAIA NES 0 159 SWEDEN 1
39 CONGO 1 100 LAOS P.DEM.R 1 160 SWITZERLAND 1
40 COSTA RICA 1 101 LEBANON 1 161 SYRN ARAB RP 1
41 COTE D'IVOIR 1 102 LIBERIA 1 162 TAIWAN 1
42 CUBA 1 103 LIBY ARAB JM 1 163 THAILAND 1
43 CYPRUS 1 104 MADAGASCAR 1 164 TOGO 1
44 CZECHOSLOVAK 1 105 MALAWI 1 165 TRINIDAD-TOB 1
45 DENMARK (inc 1 106 MALAYSIA 1 166 TUNISIA 1
46 DJIBOUTI 1 107 MALDIVES 1 167 TURKEY 1
47 DOMINICAN RP 1 108 MALI 1 168 TURKS CAICOS 1
48 ECUADOR 1 109 MALTA 1 169 UGANDA 1
49 EEC NES 0 110 MAURITANIA 1 170 UNITED KINGD 1
50 EFTA NES 0 111 MAURITIUS 1 171 UNKNOWN PART 0
51 EGYPT 1 112 MEXICO 1 172 UNTD ARAB EM 1
52 EL SALVADOR 1 113 MIDDLE EAST 0 173 UNTD RP TANZ 1
53 EQ. GUINEA 1 114 MONGOLIA 1 174 URUGUAY 1
54 ETHIOPIA 1 115 MOROCCO 1 175 USA 1
55 FALKLAND ISL 0 116 MOZAMBIQUE 1 176 VENEZUELA 1
56 FIJI 1 117 MYANMAR (BUR 1 177 VIETNAM 1
57 FINLAND 1 118 NEPAL 1 178 WESTERN SAHA 1
58 FM DEM YEMEN 0 119 NETH ANTILLE 1 179 YEMEN 1
59 FM EUR CPE N 0 120 NETHERLANDS 1 180 ZAIRE 1
60 FM GERMAN DM 0 121 NEW CALEDONI 1 181 ZAMBIA 1
61 FM USSR 1 122 NEW ZEALAND 1 182 ZIMBABWE 1
49 56 53
Total number of countries 158
29Appendix B
We derive in this appendix a gravity equation with third-country e⁄ects, which generalizes
Anderson and van Wincoop￿ s (2003) equation, and we show that their equation applies whenever
￿ij = ￿ji for every country pair and Vij can be decomposed in a particular way. We then discuss
some limitations of their formulation.
Equality of income and expenditure implies Yi =
PJ
j=1 Mji. That is, country i￿ s exports to all

































j=1 Yj is world income and sh = Yh=Y is the share of country h in world income.
We next show that if Vij is decomposable in a particular way, and transport costs are symmetric
(i.e., ￿ij = ￿ji for all i and j), then (B2) yields the generalized gravity equation that has been derived
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their speci￿cation satis￿es these conditions. Importantly,
however, there are other cases of interest, less restrictive than the Anderson and van Wincoop
speci￿cation, that satisfy them too. Therefore, our derivation of the gravity equation shows that
it applies under wider circumstances, and in particular, when there is productivity heterogeneity
across ￿rms and ￿rms bear ￿xed costs of exporting. Under these circumstances only a fraction of
the ￿rms export; those with the highest productivity. Finally, note that our general formulation
￿ without decomposability ￿ is more relevant for empirical analysis, because, unlike previous
formulations, it enables bilateral trade ￿ ows to equal zero. This ￿ exibility is important because, as
we have explained in the introduction, there are many zero bilateral trade ￿ ows in the data.
Consider the following





where ’IM;i depends only on the parameters of the importing country, ’EX;j depends only
on the parameters of the exporting country, and ’ij = ’ji for all i;j.
In this decomposition, only the symmetric terms ’ij depend on the joint identity of the importing
and exporting countries, whereas all other parameters do not.
30To illustrate circumstances in which the decomposability assumption is satis￿ed, ￿rst consider
a situation where the ￿xed costs fij are very small, so that aij > aH for all i;j. That is, the lowest
productivity level that makes exporting pro￿table, 1=aij, is lower than the lowest productivity level
in the support of G(￿), 1=aH. Under these circumstances all ￿rms export and Vij is the same for
every country pair i;j.53 Alternatively, suppose that productivity 1=a has a Pareto distribution
with shape k and aL = 0. That is, G(a) = (a=aH)
k for 0 ￿ a ￿ aH. Moreover, let either fij depend
only on the identity of the exporter, so that fij = fj, or let the ￿xed costs be symmetric, so that
fij = fji. Then Vij satis￿es the decomposability assumption and in every country j only a fraction
of ￿rms export to country i.54




















This is essentially the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) system. Evidently, the solution of the
Qjs depends only on income shares and transport costs, and possibly on a constant in Vij that is
embodied in the ’ijs. However, an upward shift of this constant raises proportionately the product
QiQj, and therefore has no e⁄ect on Mij. Therefore, imports of country i from j as a share of




54Under these conditions Vij = k (aij)
k￿"+1 =(aH)
k (k ￿ " + 1) and either aij = [cjfj=(1 ￿ ￿)]
1=(1￿") =(￿ijcj=￿Pi),
so that fj becomes part of vEX;j whereas ￿ij becomes part of ￿ij, or aij = [cjfij=(1 ￿ ￿)]
1=(1￿") =(￿ijcj=￿Pi), so
that fij and ￿ij become part of ￿ij.






















































Equations (F2) and (F3) together with symmetry conditions ￿ij = ￿ji and ’ij = ’ji then imply that Qj = ^ Qj for
every j. As a result (F1) and (F2) yield the equations in the text.
31world income, which equal imports of country j from i as a share of world income, depend only on
the structure of trade costs and the size distribution of countries. Bilateral imports as a fraction of
world income are proportional to the product of the two countries￿shares in world income, with the
factor of proportionality depending on the structure of trading costs and the worldwide distribution
of relative country size.
The decomposability assumption is too restrictive, however. It implies that if imports of country
i from j equal zero, i.e., Vij = 0, then either ’IM;i is in￿nite or ’EX;j is in￿nite, because " > 1. In
the former case imports of country i equal zero from all countries, while in the latter case exports
of country j equal zero to all countries. In other words, some countries do not import at all while
other countries do not export at all; but it is not possible for a country to import from some other
countries but not from all of them or for a county to export to some other countries but not to all of
them. These restrictions are not consistent with the data. As we have explained in the introduction,
most countries trade only with a fraction of the countries in the world economy; neither with all
of them nor with none of them. To explain these patterns, we need a ￿ exible model that allows
for zero bilateral trade ￿ ows. Such a model should help in explaining which countries trade with
each other and the resulting volumes of bilateral trade ￿ ows. Indeed, the logic of our theoretical
model suggests that the decision to export to a foreign country is not independent of the volume of
exports. For this reason the decision to export should be analyzed in conjunction with the decision
on the export volume. Moreover, unlike (B3) and (B4), a suitable model should allow country
j￿ s exports to i to di⁄er from country i￿ s exports to j. Unlike standard estimation procedures of
the gravity equations, a model of this sort will enable estimation that takes advantage of all the
observations in the data, not only observations of country pairs that have positive two-way bilateral
trade ￿ ows. For these reasons we use the less restrictive equations (4)-(7) for estimation purposes.
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35Table 1: Benchmark Gravity and Selection Into Trading Relationships
1 3 5
m_ij m_ij m_ij
Variables Coeff. dF/dX Coeff. dF/dX Coeff. dF/dX
Distance -1.176 -0.660 -0.263 -1.201 -0.618 -0.246 -1.200 -0.618 -0.246
(0.031)** (0.029)** (0.012)** (0.024)** (0.021)** (0.008)** (0.024)** (0.021)** (0.008)**
Land border 0.458 -0.382 -0.148 0.366 -0.380 -0.146 0.364 -0.380 -0.146
(0.147)** (0.129)* (0.047)* (0.131)** (0.089)** (0.032)** (0.131)** (0.089)** (0.032)**
Island -0.391 -0.345 -0.136 -0.381 -0.355 -0.140 -0.378 -0.355 -0.140
(0.121)** (0.082)** (0.032)** (0.096)** (0.056)** (0.022)** (0.096)** (0.056)** (0.022)**
Landlock -0.561 -0.181 -0.072 -0.582 -0.220 -0.087 -0.581 -0.221 -0.087
(0.188)** (0.114) (0.045) (0.148)** (0.071)** (0.028)** (0.147)** (0.071)** (0.028)**
Legal 0.486 0.096 0.038 0.406 0.072 0.029 0.407 0.071 0.028
(0.050)** (0.034)* (0.014)* (0.040)** (0.022)** (0.009)** (0.040)** (0.022)** (0.009)**
Language 0.176 0.284 0.113 0.207 0.275 0.109 0.203 0.273 0.108
(0.061)** (0.042)** (0.016)** (0.047)** (0.027)** (0.011)** (0.047)** (0.027)** (0.011)**
Colonial Ties 1.299 0.325 0.128 1.321 0.288 0.114 1.326 0.293 0.116
(0.120)** (0.305) (0.117) (0.110)** (0.209) (0.082) (0.110)** (0.211) (0.082)
Currency Union 1.364 0.492 0.190 1.395 0.530 0.206 1.409 0.531 0.206
(0.255)** (0.143)** (0.052)** (0.187)** (0.071)** (0.026)** (0.187)** (0.071)** (0.026)**
FTA 0.759 1.985 0.494 0.996 1.854 0.497 0.976 1.842 0.495
(0.222)** (0.315)** (0.020)** (0.213)** (0.207)** (0.018)** (0.214)** (0.207)** (0.018)**
Religion 0.102 0.261 0.104 -0.018 0.249 0.099 -0.038 0.245 0.098
(0.096) (0.063)** (0.025)** (0.076) (0.040)** (0.016)** (0.077) (0.040)** (0.016)**
WTO (none) -0.068 -0.143 -0.056
(0.058) (0.033)** (0.013)**
WTO (both) 0.303 0.234 0.093
(0.042)** (0.032)** (0.013)**
Observations 11,146 24,649 24,649 110,697 248,060 248,060 110,697 248,060 248,060
R-Squared 0.709 0.587 0.587 0.682 0.551 0.551 0.682 0.551 0.551
Notes:
Exporter, Importer, and year fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1986 1980s
T_ij (Probit) T_ij (Probit) T_ij (Probit)
2 4 6
36Table 2: Baseline Results
T_ij T_ij
Variables (Probit) Benchmark ML (Probit) Benchmark ML
Distance -0.660 -1.181 -0.801 -0.618 -1.198 -0.822
(0.029)** (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.021)** (0.024)** (0.024)**
Land border -0.382 0.468 0.831 -0.380 0.360 0.702
(0.129)* (0.146)** (0.139)** (0.089)** (0.131)** (0.123)**
Island -0.345 -0.387 -0.171 -0.355 -0.379 -0.143
(0.082)** (0.120)** (0.117) (0.056)** (0.096)** (0.094)
Landlock -0.181 -0.556 -0.448 -0.221 -0.582 -0.440
(0.114) (0.188)** (0.187)* (0.071)** (0.147)** (0.147)**
Legal 0.096 0.490 0.388 0.071 0.406 0.327
(0.034)* (0.050)** (0.049)** (0.022)** (0.040)** (0.039)**
Language 0.284 0.187 0.024 0.273 0.198 0.033
(0.042)** (0.061)* (0.06) (0.027)** (0.047)** (0.046)
Colonial Ties 0.325 1.299 1.003 0.293 1.326 1.061
(0.305) (0.121)** (0.114)** (0.211) (0.110)** (0.106)**
Currency Union 0.492 1.356 1.026 0.531 1.412 1.034
(0.143)** (0.256)** (0.258)** (0.071)** (0.187)** (0.191)**
FTA 1.985 0.756 0.386 1.842 0.978 0.519
(0.315)** (0.222)** (0.171)* (0.207)** (0.214)** (0.148)**
Religion 0.261 -- X 0.245 -- X
(0.063)** (0.040)**
WTO (none) -- -- -- -0.143 -0.070 0.001
(0.033)** (0.058) (0.058)
WTO (both) -- -- -- 0.234 0.302 0.143
(0.032)** (0.042)** (0.042)**
delta (from w_hat) -- -- 0.716 -- -- 0.794
(0.060)** (0.067)**
eta_hat -- -- 0.399 -- -- 0.270
(0.063)** (0.049)**
Observations 24,649 11,146 11,146 248,060 110,697 110,697
R-Squared 0.587 0.709 -- 0.551 0.682 --
Notes:
Exporter, Importer, and year fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)





37Table 3: Alternate Excluded Variables
T_ij T_ij
Variables (Probit) Benchmark ML (Probit) Benchmark ML
Distance -0.577 -1.106 -0.834 -0.584 -1.123 -0.836
(0.044)** (0.036)** (0.045)** (0.043)** (0.037)** (0.045)**
Land border -0.233 0.577 0.871 -0.230 0.577 0.856
(0.181) (0.162)** (0.160)** (0.183) (0.161)** (0.161)**
Island -0.435 -0.445 -0.214 -0.454 -0.457 -0.227
(0.202)* (0.206)* (0.252) (0.200)* (0.204)* (0.252)
Landlock -0.129 -0.453 -0.351 -0.145 -0.462 -0.358
(0.134) (0.191)* (0.185) (0.135) (0.190)* (0.185)
Legal 0.123 0.524 0.442 0.135 0.533 0.441
(0.052)* (0.060)** (0.063)** (0.052)** (0.060)** (0.063)**
Language 0.287 0.127 -0.012 0.287 0.124 -0.019
(0.061)** (0.071) (0.075) (0.061)** (0.071) (0.075)
Colonial Ties 0.014 1.024 0.838 -0.026 1.014 0.832
(0.343) (0.130)** (0.145)** (0.353) (0.130)** (0.145)**
Currency Union 0.705 1.502 1.049 0.743 1.571 1.073
(0.179)** (0.333)** (0.327)** (0.182)** (0.334)** (0.327)**
FTA 2.667 0.443 0.183 2.681 0.453 0.206
(0.525)** (0.227) (0.192) (0.524)** (0.225)* (0.192)
Religion 0.388 0.221 X 0.385 0.236 0.118
(0.092)** (0.115) (0.093)** (0.115)* (0.118)
Regulation Costs -- -- -- -0.291 -0.220 X
(0.095)** (0.095)*
R. Costs (Days & Proc.) -- -- -- -0.163 -0.252 X
(0.080)* (0.121)*
delta (from w_hat) -- -- 0.605 -- -- 0.584
(0.077)** (0.078)**
eta_hat -- -- 0.251 -- -- 0.270
(0.091)** (0.091)**
Observations 12,198 7,629 6,602 12,198 7,629 6,602
R-Squared -- 0.734 -- -- 0.734 --
Notes:
Exporter and Importer fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)






38Table 4: Alternate Speci￿cations
ML
Variables 50 Bins 100 Bins
Distance -0.801 -0.865 -0.671 -0.623
(0.030)** (0.040)** (0.059)** (0.076)**
Land border 0.831 0.784 0.894 0.924
(0.139)** (0.144)** (0.147)** (0.150)**
Island -0.171 -0.201 -0.091 -0.074
(0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.121)
Landlock -0.448 -0.483 -0.437 -0.439
(0.187)* (0.186)** (0.186)* (0.186)*
Legal 0.388 0.385 0.350 0.345
(0.049)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.050)**
Language 0.024 0.046 -0.044 -0.062
(0.06) (0.061) (0.064) (0.068)
Colonial Ties 1.003 1.039 0.960 0.929
(0.114)** (0.116)** (0.117)** (0.119)**
Currency Union 1.026 1.108 0.977 0.960
(0.258)** (0.261)** (0.265)** (0.270)**
FTA 0.386 0.462 0.050 -0.091
(0.171)* (0.162)** (0.165) (0.210)
Religion X X X X
z_hat -- 3.620 -- --
(0.390)**
z_hat^2 -- -0.791 -- --
(0.125)**
z_hat^3 -- 0.065 -- --
(0.013)**
delta (from w_hat) 0.716 -- -- --
(0.060)**
eta_hat 0.399 1.139 -- --
(0.063)** (0.139)**
Observations 11,146 11,146 11,146 11,146
R-Squared -- 0.721 0.722 0.723
Notes:
m_ij is dependent variable throughout
Exporter and Importer fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)





39Table 5: Alternate Speci￿cations and Excluded Variables
ML ML
Variables 50 Bins 100 Bins 50 Bins 100 Bins
Distance -0.834 -0.857 -0.751 -0.731 -0.836 -0.849 -0.755 -0.789
(0.045)** (0.050)** (0.069)** (0.089)** (0.045)** (0.052)** (0.070)** (0.088)**
Land border 0.871 0.853 0.903 0.907 0.856 0.844 0.892 0.863
(0.160)** (0.164)** (0.166)** (0.167)** (0.161)** (0.166)** (0.170)** (0.170)**
Island -0.214 -0.222 -0.171 -0.142 -0.227 -0.220 -0.161 -0.197
(0.252) (0.259) (0.265) (0.266) (0.252) (0.258) (0.259) (0.258)
Landlock -0.351 -0.362 -0.347 -0.344 -0.358 -0.363 -0.352 -0.353
(0.185) (0.188) (0.190) (0.192) (0.185) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
Legal 0.442 0.443 0.424 0.418 0.441 0.435 0.407 0.418
(0.063)** (0.064)** (0.065)** (0.066)** (0.063)** (0.064)** (0.065)** (0.065)**
Language -0.012 -0.003 -0.06 -0.068 -0.019 -0.016 -0.061 -0.036
(0.075) (0.077) (0.079) (0.085) (0.075) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Colonial Ties 0.838 0.839 0.837 0.830 0.832 0.848 0.853 0.838
(0.145)** (0.147)** (0.149)** (0.148)** (0.145)** (0.148)** (0.152)** (0.153)**
Currency Union 1.049 1.106 1.021 0.984 1.073 1.153 1.045 1.107
(0.327)** (0.334)** (0.341)** (0.353)** (0.327)** (0.333)** (0.337)** (0.346)**
FTA 0.183 0.267 -0.161 -0.200 0.206 0.251 -0.141 0.065
(0.192) (0.199) (0.250) (0.337) (0.192) (0.197) (0.250) (0.348)
Religion X X X X 0.118 0.141 0.073 0.100
(0.118) (0.120) (0.124) (0.128)
Regulation Costs -- -- -- -- X X X X
R. Costs (Days & Proc.) -- -- -- -- X X X X
z_hat -- 3.232 -- -- -- 3.279 -- --
(0.544)** (0.545)**
z_hat^2 -- -0.713 -- -- -- -0.721 -- --
(0.172)** (0.172)**
z_hat^3 -- 0.061 -- -- -- 0.062 -- --
(0.018)** (0.018)**
delta (from w_hat) 0.605 -- -- -- 0.584 -- -- --
(0.077)** (0.078)**
eta_hat 0.251 0.831 -- -- 0.270 0.892 -- --
(0.091)** (0.212)** (0.091)** (0.210)**
Observations 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602 6,602
R-Squared -- 0.700 0.702 0.705 -- 0.701 0.704 0.706
Notes:
m_ij is dependent variable throughout
Exporter and Importer fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)









40Table 6: Bias Decomposition
Firm Heckman
Variables Heterogeneity Selection
Distance -1.181 -0.801 -0.824 -1.214
(0.031)** (0.030)** (0.036)** (0.031)**
Land border 0.468 0.831 0.807 0.436
(0.146)** (0.139)** (0.139)** (0.149)**
Island -0.387 -0.171 -0.148 -0.425
(0.120)** (0.117) (0.119) (0.120)**
Landlock -0.556 -0.448 -0.450 -0.565
(0.188)** (0.187)* (0.190)* (0.187)**
Legal 0.490 0.388 0.420 0.488
(0.050)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.050)**
Language 0.187 0.024 -0.008 0.223
(0.061)** (0.06) (0.061) (0.061)**
Colonial Ties 1.299 1.003 1.051 1.311
(0.121)** (0.114)** (0.114)** (0.123)**
Currency Union 1.356 1.026 1.028 1.391
(0.256)** (0.258)** (0.256)** (0.257)**
FTA 0.756 0.386 0.502 0.737
(0.222)** (0.171)* (0.160)** (0.235)**
delta (from w_hat) -- 0.716 -- --
(0.060)**
eta_hat -- 0.399 -- 0.265
(0.063)** (0.070)**
z_hat -- -- 0.611 --
(0.043)**
Observations 11,146 11,146 11,146 11,146
R-squared 0.709 -- 0.713 0.710
Notes:
m_ij is dependent variable throughout
Exporter and Importer fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)




Variable T_ij - T_ji
rho_hat_ij - rho_hat_ji 0.994
(0.023)**




w_hat_ij - w_hat_ji 2.073 1.820
(0.079)** (0.320)**




All data for 1986
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
m_ij - m_ji
Table 8: Summary Statistics of theTrade Elasticity Response Across Country Pairs
Country Number of
Pair Country
Group Pairs Mean S. D. Min Max Mean S. D. Min Max
NN 342 1.295 0.034 1.285 1.645 1.294 0.107 1.145 2.226
NS 4,626 1.406 0.152 1.285 2.951 1.528 0.386 1.145 2.905
SS 6,178 1.700 0.303 1.285 3.780 2.134 0.445 1.145 3.007
Overall 11,146 1.566 0.289 1.285 3.780 1.857 0.519 1.145 3.007
Maximum Likelihood Polynomial Aproximation
42Table 9: The Formation of Trading Relationships
Country
Pair No Start Start
Group Trade Trade Trade Percent Trade Percent
NN 342
NS 4,626 656 19 2.9% 420 64.0%
SS 6,178 13,004 62 0.5% 2,575 19.8%
Total 11,146 13,660 81 0.6% 2,995 21.9%
Notes:
Percent is relative to number of country pairs that do not trade
Data 50% Drop 80% Drop
Distance Cost Change
43